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SO HOW DID WE GET INTO THIS MESS? 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE LEGITIMACY OF 
CITIZENS UNITED 
Alexander Polikoff* 
How did the American body politic allow business corporations to 
threaten members of Congress by saying, credibly, ―Do what we want or 
we‘ll bury you!‖? 
On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court‘s 5-4 decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission interpreted the U.S. Constitution‘s 
First Amendment to permit corporations to spend unlimited amounts of 
money to support or oppose their chosen candidates.1  ―[A] lobbyist,‖ said 
the front page of the next day‘s New York Times, ―can now tell any elected 
official that [if you vote wrong,] my company, labor union or interest group 
will spend unlimited sums explicitly advertising against your re-election.‖2  
The headline read, ―Lobbies‘ New Power: Cross Us, And Our Cash Will 
Bury You.‖3 
―Bury‖ was metaphoric but not hyperbolic.  In 2008, profits of the top 
100 Fortune 500 companies amounted to $600 billion.4  Were a mere one 
percent of those profits allocated to electioneering, the resulting $6 billion 
fund would double what the Obama or McCain campaigns spent, or what 
every candidate for a House or Senate seat spent, during the 2008 election 
cycle.5  In the recent rancorous health care debate, over 3,300 persons—
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To channel my distress in a useful way, I decided to try to understand 
how it could have happened.  Not politically, but ―doctrinally.‖  How could 
such a result have been reached under the law?  The answer, as it turned 
out, was that it couldn‘t be.  More on that later. 
I. THREE STAGES 
The journey to Citizens United had several stages.  One was the devel-
opment of the First Amendment to include under its protective umbrella at-
tempts to influence elections either by donations to candidates or by 
spending money to influence voters about candidates—for example, by 
making a television movie opposing Hillary Clinton‘s run for the Presiden-
cy, which is what Citizens United was about.  Spending money to influence 
elections is considered speech because it is a way to express or influence 
opinions; I will call it ―election speech.‖ 
This stage of the journey is pretty easy to trace.  Although adopted in 
1791, the First Amendment‘s speech clause—―Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech‖7—did not achieve its initial expli-
cit victory in the Supreme Court until 1931 (over a California law making it 
illegal to display a red flag symbolizing opposition to organized govern-
ment).8  Forty years and many decisions later, University of Chicago law 
professor Harry Kalven, Jr., then the country‘s preeminent First Amend-
ment scholar, observed that speech problems were ―difficult to conceptual-
ize and to relate to each other.‖9  He suggested that it might be a mistake to 
search for a unitary theory of freedom of speech under the Constitution, that 
perhaps one should seek ―not so much an organizing principle‖ as an ―or-
ganizing map‖ on which to place the problems.10 
Several hundred First Amendment decisions by the Supreme Court 
have followed that initial red flag case but—as Harry Kalven had pre-
dicted—no unitary theory applying to all of them has emerged.  Even with-
out an overarching theory, however, once the First Amendment began to 
appear on the judicial landscape, its ―coverage‖ of election speech was nev-
er in serious doubt.11  John Doe had a First Amendment right to contribute 
to Jane Doe‘s (or Hillary Clinton‘s) campaign and to spend money to sup-
port or oppose her. 
Another stage of the journey was to decide whether everyone‘s pro-
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some speakers unable to fit under the First Amendment umbrella, not be-
cause of what they were saying but because of who they were?  The answer 
was yes, there were exceptions—several, in fact.  Prisoners were one.  So 
were members of the Armed Forces.  So were students.  In each of these 
cases, in spite of the First Amendment‘s absolute language, the Supreme 
Court ruled that in certain contexts the government could impose restric-
tions on the speech rights of prisoners,12 soldiers,13 and students.14 
When prisoners tried to organize a ―union,‖ the Court held that a pris-
oner does not have First Amendment rights ―inconsistent with . . . the legi-
timate penological objectives of the corrections system.‖15  Ruling that an 
Army Captain did not have a First Amendment right to advise black sol-
diers not to go to Vietnam, the Court said that ―the different character of the 
military community and of the military mission requires a different applica-
tion‖ of the First Amendment.16  Similar rulings applied to students who, 
because of the legitimate interests of their educational institutions, were 
held not to have the same First Amendment rights as non-students.17 
The Court also upheld laws barring federal employees not only from 
contributing to members of Congress but also from taking part in political 
campaigns.18  Among the reasons were that the government and its em-
ployees should ―avoid practicing political justice,‖ and that they should 
―appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of repre-
sentative Government [was] not to be eroded.‖19 
After two stages of the journey, then, the First Amendment clearly pro-
tected election speech, but speech by certain groups of speakers could in 
certain contexts be restricted because of who they were.  In most of the cas-
es referred to so far, the speaker was a human being; the third stage in the 
journey to Citizens United involved corporations as speakers.  Corporations 
are artificial beings, created by law.  Does that make a difference in whether 
they fit under the First Amendment umbrella? 
For a long time before the Citizens United decision, the answer was 
yes; it did make a difference.  In the country‘s infancy, the few corporations 
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tie whatever strings they wished to the charters they issued.20  Soon, general 
―incorporation‖ statutes replaced charters, but these too could (and still do) 
contain all manner of regulatory strings.21  In the early years of our country, 
the Bill of Rights was not thought to apply to corporations.22  And the evils 
of permitting corporations to engage in electioneering were thought to be 
self-evident. 
In 1907, when at the request of President Theodore Roosevelt23 Con-
gress banned corporate contributions to candidates,24 a Senate Report on the 
proposed new law observed, 
 
The evils of the use of money in connection with political 
elections are so generally recognized that the committee 
deem it unnecessary to make any argument in favor of the 
general purpose of this measure.  It is in the interest of 
good government and calculated to promote purity in the 
selection of public officials.25 
 
In the years following 1907, the initial ban on corporate contributions, 
which came to be called the Corrupt Practices Act,26 was tinkered with in a 
number of ways, both by Congress and, as corporations gradually gained 
First Amendment protection,27 by the Supreme Court.  The tinkering pro-
duced a complicated piece of machinery, but it always included limitations 
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In the 1940s, because of the growing influence of organized labor, 
Congress extended the ban on corporate contributions to include unions.28  
In addition, because the contributions ban had been construed so narrowly 
(only prohibiting donating money directly to a candidate) that corporations 
were able to defeat the purpose of the law by supporting candidates in other 
ways, Congress banned ―expenditures‖ as well as contributions.29  The 
hallmark of an expenditure was that even though it was made for the pur-
pose of supporting or opposing a candidate, it was not paid to a candidate 
(or her organization or party) but was supposedly made independently, 
without the candidate‘s participation or even prior knowledge.30 
As First Amendment speech law became more robust, the Supreme 
Court also began to make clear that restrictions on election speech had to 
comply with First Amendment principles.  Among other requirements, leg-
islation restricting speech had to be ―narrowly tailored‖ to focus on the pre-
cise matter with which Congress was legitimately concerned, and it could 
not be so vague as to leave uncertain the conduct that was proscribed.  
Court decisions made it clear, for example, that the expenditure ban could 
not preclude unions and corporations from communicating freely with their 
members and stockholders.31
 
Congressional tinkering continued with the enactment in the early 
1970s of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which provided some 
public financing of presidential races, created a Federal Election Commis-
sion to oversee election regulation, and authorized corporations and unions 
to set up electioneering organizations called Political Action Committees, 
or PACs.32  Among other requirements, organizations like PACs had to be 
funded with voluntary contributions that could not come from a corpora-
tion‘s or a union‘s treasury.33  In a 1972 opinion, the Court quoted appro-
vingly a member of Congress who had said that the PAC-type arrangements 
maintained ―the proper balance in regulating corporate and union political 
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Additional tinkering by the Supreme Court dealt with nonprofit corpo-
rations—not the business corporations that had been the focus of the Cor-
rupt Practices Act.  As this narrow tailoring finally emerged from several 
cases, a nonprofit could engage in election speech if it was formed to pro-
mote political ideas (so its resources reflected political support rather than 
commercial success), if it had no shareholders (so individuals who paid 
money into it would not have their funds used to support candidates they 
opposed), and if it was not established by, and did not accept contributions 
from, a business corporation or union.35  (Citizens United was itself a non-
profit, albeit a wealthy one, but because it received a small amount of sup-
port from business corporations it was not entitled to this nonprofit 
exemption.) 
In 1976, the Court tinkered further in an important way.  In Buckley v. 
Valeo, while upholding the FECA‘s limitations on contributions, to avoid 
running afoul of the First Amendment‘s proscription against vagueness, it 
construed ―expenditures‖ to include only communications that expressly 
advocated the election or defeat of identified candidates.36  Then, on First 
Amendment grounds (restricting speech without sufficiently compelling 
reasons) it overturned the expenditures ban, so construed, as to ―persons‖ 
(including individuals), although it did not address—and therefore left in-
tact—the law‘s separate ban on expenditures by corporations and unions.37 
The grandest tinkering of all came about in response to the foreseeable 
consequence of the constrained meaning assigned to ―expenditures.‖  Just 
as the narrow construction of contributions had earlier led to the loophole of 
expenditures, so the narrow construction of expenditures led to the loophole 
of ―issue ads.‖  Eschewing what came to be called ―magic words,‖ such as 
―vote for‖ or ―vote against,‖ electioneering proceeded apace under the guise 
of discussing issues, not candidates.  Instead of urging viewers to ―vote 
against Jane Doe,‖ an ad might condemn Jane Doe‘s record on a selected 
issue and then encourage viewers to ―call Jane Doe and tell her what you 
think.‖38 
The result was that in 2002 Congress enacted a comprehensive new 
regulatory scheme, sponsored by Senators John McCain and Russell Fein-
gold, called the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).39  To address 
the ―issue ads‖ problem, the BCRA forbade corporations to engage in ―elec-
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sixty days before a federal general election.40  (This was the provision that 
immediately affected Citizens United, which wished to make its anti-
Hillary movie available through video-on-demand technology within these 
time periods.41)  The BCRA defined ―electioneering communication‖ as 
―any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication‖ within the pre-election 
run-up periods that refers to a candidate and (except for presidential candi-
dates) is geographically targeted.42 
The BCRA‘s constitutionality was promptly challenged under the First 
Amendment, but in 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the basic scheme in 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.43  Citing a number of opinions 
in which it had said that the importance of elections in a democratic society 
justified imposing restrictions on the election speech of business corpora-
tions, the McConnell opinion emphasized preventing the appearance of cor-
ruption in the electoral process and avoiding erosion of citizen confidence 
in government.44  The Court also said the BCRA was not unconstitutionally 
overbroad because, among other reasons, corporations and unions could 
―finance genuine issue ads during [the run-up] timeframes by simply avoid-
ing any specific reference to federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by pay-
ing for the ad from a segregated [PAC] fund.‖45 
In short, over the nearly one hundred years from 1907 to the enactment 
of the BCRA, Congress exercised its constitutional power to regulate the 
manner of conducting federal elections by crafting regulations that limited 
the electoral role of corporations and, later, unions.  In the process, it treated 
corporations and unions very differently from human beings.  Although 
corporations, for better or worse, had managed to overcome their artificial 
beginnings and acquire considerable First Amendment protection, the con-
gressional interest in preventing corruption, or the appearance of it, from in-
fecting elections had also permitted serious regulation of corporate election 
speech.  While insistent upon compliance with First Amendment require-
ments, the Supreme Court had not viewed that regulation as violating cor-





  See BCRA § 201(a). 
41
  See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914. 
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  See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224 (―In the main we uphold BCRA‘s two principal, complementary 
features: the control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering communications‖). 
44
  See id. at 203–07.  The McConnell opinion said that the Court had ―repeatedly sustained legisla-
tion aimed at ‗the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumu-
lated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public‘s support for 
the corporation‘s political ideas.‘‖  Id. at 205 (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 657–61 (describing cases justifying restrictions 
on corporate election speech based on democratic principles) (link). 
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II. THE APPLECART UPSET 
Citizens United upset the applecart big time by ruling that, except for 
direct contributions to candidates, corporate election speech could not be 
restricted (and that the anti-Hillary Clinton movie could be shown) because 
corporations had virtually the same election speech rights as human be-
ings.46 Also upset (overruled) were two of the Court‘s earlier decisions that 
had upheld restrictions on corporate election speech under the First 
Amendment47 
The reasoning was breathtakingly simple.  It amounted to asserting that 
the First Amendment did not permit regulation of speech based on the 
―identity‖ of the speaker, meaning ―identity‖ as a corporation—not, say, 
Texaco versus Shell, but being a corporation rather than a human being.48  
Yet wasn‘t the speech of prisoners, soldiers, students, and government em-
ployees restricted precisely because of their ―identity‖ as prisoners, soldiers, 
students, and government employees?  These cases, however, are all ―inap-
posite,‖ says Citizens United.  The explanation for that succinct dismissal is 
set out in three short sentences, written by Justice Kennedy and agreed to 
by the four other justices who made up the Citizens United 5-4 majority: 
 
 ―[T]hese rulings were based on an interest in allowing go-
vernmental entities to perform their functions. . . .‖49 
 
 ―These precedents stand only for the proposition that there are 
certain governmental functions that cannot operate without 
some restrictions on particular kinds of speech.‖50 
 
 ―The corporate [election speech] at issue in this case, however, 
would not interfere with governmental functions . . . .‖51 
 
Let‘s consider the first two of these sentences—the third we‘ll look at 
later.  (One of the dissenting justices, John Paul Stevens, wrote that the 
―proposition‖ in the second sentence ―lies at the heart of this case.‖52)  Is it 
a governmental function to ―operate‖ federal elections, just as it is a go-
vernmental function to operate prisons, armies, schools, and post offices?  





  See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
47
  Citizens United overruled Austin, 494 U.S. 652, and McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.  See Citizens Unit-
ed, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
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  See id. at 899. 
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  Id. 
50
  Id. 
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  Id. 
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  Id. at 946 n.46. 
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with paid government employees.  But Congress does have the power to 
pass laws about the way members of Congress are elected.  The Constitu-
tion says that the ―[m]anner‖ of holding congressional elections within each 
state shall be determined by the state legislature but then adds that Congress 
may ―make or alter such Regulations.‖53  In other words, Congress may 
―make‖ regulations—that is, pass laws—to govern the manner in which 
elections for members of Congress are held.  The Supreme Court has held 
that this power extends to presidential elections as well: ―The power of 
Congress to protect the election of President and Vice President from cor-
ruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question pri-
marily addressed to the judgment of Congress.‖54 
On what basis, then, did Justice Kennedy and four other justices reach 
their Citizens United conclusion?  If it was constitutional to prevent prison-
ers from encouraging each other to form a prisoner‘s union because of the 
needs of running a prison; if it was constitutional to prevent army officers 
from encouraging soldiers to disobey orders because of the needs of run-
ning an army; if it was constitutional to prevent government employees 
from taking part in political campaigns because of the need to avoid an ap-
pearance that ―political justice‖ might be dispensed; why wasn‘t it constitu-
tional to prevent business corporations from swamping voters with 
broadcast, cable, and satellite electioneering during the run-up to federal 
elections because of the need to keep those elections free from an appear-
ance of corruption? 
Unhappily, intellectual irresponsibility appears to be the answer.  One 
way to demonstrate this is to consider how Justice Kennedy handles two 
Supreme Court cases, decided in 1976 and 1978, to which he attributes the 
―principle‖ that is the keystone of his Citizens United opinion—that the 
First Amendment precludes government from restricting speech based on 
―corporate identity.‖ 
In Buckley v. Valeo, numerous plaintiffs challenged the constitutionali-
ty of each of five major features of the FECA: (1) public funding of presi-
dential campaigns; (2) limitations on campaign contributions; (3) 
limitations on independent expenditures; (4) disclosure requirements for 
both contributions and expenditures; and (5) creation of a Federal Election 
Commission to administer the Act.55  The case produced six different opi-
nions that ranged from viewing most of the Act as constitutional to most of 
it as unconstitutional.  The Court‘s opinion was issued per curiam, meaning 
―by the court,‖ without—as is the usual practice—identifying an individual 
Justice responsible for authoring it. 
What emerged from the per curiam Buckley opinion was that the Fed-





  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (link). 
54
  Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934) (link). 
55
  See 424 U.S. 1, 9 (1976). 
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vived, with some modifications, as did disclosure requirements.56  Limita-
tions on campaign contributions were also upheld because of the govern-
mental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of it.57  
Limitations on independent expenditures, however, were ruled unconstitu-
tional because, the per curiam opinion said, this governmental interest was 
inadequate to justify the infringement on speech that resulted from barring 
independent expenditures.58 
Buckley‘s reasons for distinguishing between contributions and inde-
pendent expenditures will be discussed in connection with Justice Kenne-
dy‘s third sentence.  Of present interest is Justice Kennedy‘s use of Buckley 
respecting corporations as ―speakers.‖  As to this, his Citizens United opi-
nion says that, ―the principle established in Buckley . . . [is] that the Gov-
ernment may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker‘s 
corporate identity.‖59 
This sentence is astonishing for three reasons.  One is that Buckley con-
tains no discussion of suppressing speech on the basis of the speaker‘s cor-
porate identity.  Both the contribution section of the law that was upheld 
and the independent expenditures section that was not applied to all manner 
of ―persons‖—human beings, groups, associations, corporations, and so 
on.60  When Buckley‘s analysis led it to strike down limitations on indepen-
dent expenditures, it was because of the restrictive effect those limitations 
were perceived to have on the election speech of all those ―persons,‖ in-
cluding human beings.61  Buckley‘s discussion of this restrictive effect did 
not mention suppressing election speech ―on the basis of the speaker‘s cor-
porate identity.‖62 
The second reason for astonishment is that Buckley left untouched a 
provision of the FECA—the then-current version of the Corrupt Practices 
Act—that did suppress corporate election speech.  This section of the Act, 
separate from the one that applied to ―persons,‖ prohibited both contribu-
tions and independent expenditures by national banks, corporations and la-







  Id. at 143. 
57
  Id. at 25–29. 
58
  See id. at 39–45. 
59
  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
60
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17–23. 
61
  In a later opinion the Court said that ―. . . Buckley addressed issues that primarily related to con-
tributions and expenditures by individuals . . . .‖  McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 122 
(2003). 
63
  In fact, even as to human beings Buckley left the door ajar for future developments, saying that 
independent expenditures did not ―presently appear‖ to pose an apparent corruption threat comparable to 
the threat arising from direct contributions.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46. 
63
  See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 10 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. V 1976) (reflecting amendments through Jan. 1, 1975)). 
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Moreover, not only was this separate section not declared unconstitu-
tional by Buckley, it was not even attacked by the plaintiffs (who did attack 
virtually everything else in the FECA).64  The failure of the Buckley plain-
tiffs to include the separate section among their targets could, of course, ex-
plain Buckley‘s silence about it—except that Buckley was not silent about 
this different treatment of corporations and unions but actually referred to it 
approvingly.  Explaining that contribution limitations were being upheld in 
part because they left persons free to engage in political expression in ways 
other than through contributions to candidates, such as through ―political 
funds‖ (essentially, PACs), the Buckley opinion said that a ―prime example‖ 
of such a fund was that the bank/corporation/union section ―permits corpo-
rations and labor unions to establish segregated funds to solicit voluntary 
contributions to be utilized for political purposes.‖65
 
―It is implausible,‖ said Justice Stevens in his Citizens United dissent, 
―that Buckley covertly invalidated FECA‘s separate corporate and union 
campaign expenditure restriction even though that restriction had been on 
the books for decades before Buckley and would remain on the books, un-
disturbed, for decades after.‖66  He might have added that it is also implaus-
ible that Buckley would have referred approvingly to a section of the law it 
viewed as unconstitutional. 
There is a third reason for astonishment at Justice Kennedy‘s statement 
that Buckley established the principle that political speech may not be sup-
pressed on the basis of the speaker‘s corporate identity: in the years follow-
ing Buckley a number of Supreme Court opinions either said or strongly 
implied that the government might do just that, or said that the question of 
whether it could was open and undecided.  Here are some examples: 
 
1978—―Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a 
danger of real or apparent corruption in independent expendi-
tures by corporations to influence candidate elections.‖67 
 
1981—―[D]iffering restrictions placed on individuals and unincorpo-
rated associations, on the one hand, and on unions and corpo-
rations, on the other, reflect a judgment by Congress that these 
entities have differing structures and purposes, and that they 
therefore may require different forms of regulation in order to 






  See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 954 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
65
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 n.31. 
66
  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 958 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
67
  First Nat‘l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978) (link). 
68
  Cal. Med. Ass‘n v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981) (link). 
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1982—―The governmental interest in preventing both actual corrup-
tion and the appearance of corruption of elected representa-
tives has long been recognized, and there is no reason why it 
may not in this case be accomplished by treating unions, cor-
porations, and similar organizations differently from individu-
als.‖69 
 
1986—―The resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are 
not an indication of popular support for the corporation‘s po-
litical ideas. . . .  By requiring that corporate independent ex-
penditures be financed through a political committee expressly 
established to engage in campaign spending, [the law] seeks to 
prevent this threat to the political marketplace.‖70 
 
1990—―[T]he unique state-conferred corporate structure that facili-
tates the amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on in-
dependent expenditures.  Corporate wealth can unfairly 
influence elections when it is deployed in the form of inde-
pendent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise 
of political contributions.‖71 
 
2003—―Today, as in 1907, the law focuses on the ‗special characteris-
tics of the corporate structure‘ that threaten the integrity of the 
political process. . . .  ‗Substantial aggregations of wealth 
amassed by the special advantages which go with the corpo-
rate form of organization should not be converted into political 
―war chests‖ which could be used to incur political debts from 
legislators.‘‖72 
 
2003—―[O]ur prior decisions regarding campaign finance regula-
tion . . . ‗represent respect for the ―legislative judgment that 
the special characteristics of the corporate structure require 
particularly careful regulation.‖‘  We have repeatedly sus-
tained legislation aimed at ‗the corrosive and distorting effects 
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with 
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no corre-






  Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Nat‘l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210–11 (1982) (citing Cal. 
Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 201) (internal citation omitted) (link). 
70
  Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986). 
71
  Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
72
  Fed. Election Comm‘n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 153 (2003) (internal citations omitted) (link). 
73
  McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003) (internal citations omitted). 
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Each of these statements commanded at least a majority of the then-
Justices; the 1982 opinion was unanimous.74  It is plain, therefore, that not 
only was the ―principle‖ Justice Kennedy says Buckley established unmen-
tioned in the Buckley opinion, but also that it was not thereafter viewed by 
the Court as having been established. 
Justice Kennedy continues to astonish with his handling of another Su-
preme Court opinion, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,75 to which 
he also attributes the ―principle‖ that the First Amendment precludes gov-
ernment from restricting speech based on ―corporate identity.‖76  For some 
time the Massachusetts state government had been attempting to persuade 
voters to approve a referendum establishing a graduated personal income 
tax.77  Business corporations, particularly banks, had been effective oppo-
nents in previous failed referendum votes.78  Finally, the Massachusetts leg-
islature came up with the stratagem of eliminating banks and their allies 
from the referendum ―game‖ by forbidding them from making contributions 
or expenditures to influence referendum votes.79  The law contained an ex-
ception for referendum issues that ―materially affected‖ the businesses of 
banks or business corporations, but by definition income tax referenda were 
not in that category.80  In 1978, Bellotti ruled that the Massachusetts law vi-
olated the First Amendment.81 
Justice Kennedy‘s handling of Bellotti is irresponsible in at least two 
ways.  The first is the failure to discuss the significance of the fact that Bel-
lotti is about a referendum, not a candidate election.  This is important be-
cause, as first year law students are taught, general statements in judicial 
opinions are to be interpreted in light of, and generally confined in their ap-
plication to, the situation to which they are addressed.  That Bellotti was 
about a referendum, not a candidate election, is a critical fact because a re-
ferendum—unlike a candidate—cannot be politically beholden to suppor-
ters.  The Bellotti opinion itself explicitly noted the distinction: ―Referenda 
are held on issues, not candidates for public office.  The risk of corruption 
perceived in cases involving candidate elections . . . simply is not present in 
a popular vote on a public issue.‖82
 
As a first year law student would quickly have understood, statements 
in the Bellotti opinion that Justice Kennedy found useful for his Citizens 





  Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 197. 
75
  435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
76
  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 902 (2010). 
77
  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765. 
78
  Id. at 775. 
79
  See id. at 767–68. 
80
  Id. at 768. 
81
  Id. at 795. 
82
  Id. at 790 (internal citations omitted). 
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not applied to candidate elections.  Indeed, the Bellotti opinion went out of 
its way to make it clear that it wanted its statements to be confined in just 
this way: 
 
The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes 
such as the [Corrupt Practices Act] was the problem of cor-
ruption of elected representatives through the creation of 
political debts.  The importance of the government interest 
in preventing this occurrence has never been doubted.  The 
case before us presents no comparable problem, and our 
consideration of a corporation‘s right to speak on issues of 
general public interest [i.e., referenda] implies no compara-
ble right in the quite different context of participation in a 
political campaign for election to public office.  Congress 
might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger 
of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures 
by corporations to influence candidate elections.83 
 
In the face of these explicit Bellotti statements, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the distinction between the risk of corruption in referenda and can-
didate elections, a reader is incredulous to find that Justice Kennedy 
repeatedly cites, quotes, and paraphrases the Bellotti opinion without refer-
ring to that distinction. 
Justice Kennedy also abuses the Bellotti opinion by attributing to it (as 
he did earlier to Buckley) the ―principle‖ that speech cannot be restricted 
because of corporate ―identity‖:  ―Bellotti . . . reaffirmed the First Amend-
ment principle that the Government cannot restrict political speech based on 
the speaker‘s corporate identity.‖84  ―Bellotti‘s central principle [was] that 
the First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a 
speaker‘s corporate identity.‖85
 
The trouble is that Bellotti neither ―reaffirmed‖ nor articulated any 
such principle.  What it did was strike down a law that distinguished one 
kind of corporation from another—one whose business was materially af-
fected by a referendum from one whose business was not.  In fact, so car-
ried away was Justice Kennedy by his ―principle‖ that one of his quotations 
failed to indicate that it truncated Bellotti‘s language.  Justice Kennedy 
quoted this from Bellotti: ―[P]olitical speech does not lose First Amendment 
protection ‗simply because its source is a corporation.‘‖86  Had the omitted 
language been included, Justice Kennedy‘s quote would have read, 





  Id. at 788 n.26 (internal citations omitted). 
84
  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 902 (2010). 
85
  Id. at 903. 
86
  Id. at 900 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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cause its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a 
court, a material effect on its business or property.‘‖87 
Bellotti does say that the ―inherent worth‖ of speech—its capacity for 
informing the public—does not depend on whether the source is a corpora-
tion or an individual.88  But this is promptly followed by two disclaimers—
that the Court is neither addressing ―the abstract question whether corpora-
tions have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First 
Amendment,‖ nor considering ―whether, under different circumstances, a 
justification for a restriction on speech that would be inadequate as applied 
to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as applied to cor-
porations . . . .‖89 
In two respects, therefore, Justice Kennedy mangles Bellotti.  First, 
Bellotti decided nothing—was indeed at pains to decide nothing—about 
corporate expenditures in candidate elections.  Second, the opinion did not 
say or decide that corporations could never be distinguished from human 
beings under the First Amendment.  Had Justice Kennedy written his dis-
cussion of Bellotti in a law school examination, he would have flunked. 
There is one additional observation to be made about Justice Kenne-
dy‘s treatment of Buckley and Bellotti.  Justice Kennedy wrote that had the 
FECA‘s prohibition of direct expenditures by banks, corporations, and un-
ions been challenged in the wake of Buckley, the prohibition ―could not 
have been squared with the reasoning and analysis of [Buckley].‖90  Presum-
ably, this means that the FECA‘s prohibition of independent expenditures 
by banks, corporations, and unions would also have been declared unconsti-
tutional had that issue been submitted to the Buckley Court. 
Yet the Justices who approved Bellotti‘s language were, for the most 
part, the same Justices who had approved Buckley‘s language two years ear-
lier.91  In Bellotti, these Justices wrote that, ―Congress might well be able to 
demonstrate . . . a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent ex-
penditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.‖92  This pro-
vides an obvious way to ―square‖ the reasoning and analysis of Buckley—
which addressed ―issues that primarily related to contributions and expendi-





  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784.  This is not an inconsequential deletion of a few words, for in following 
sentences the Bellotti opinion makes clear its view that the ―materially affecting‖ phrase amounts to a 
requirement ―that the speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.‖  
Id. 
88
  See id. at 777. 
89
  See id. at 777 & n.13. 
90
  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902. 
91
  The composition of the Court was, in fact, unchanged, but Justice Stevens did not participate in 
Buckley.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 5 (1976) (per curiam). 
92
  435 U.S. at 788 n.26. 
93
  McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003) (describing the Buckley opinion). 
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porations, and unions.  As a matter of the plain meaning of language,94 it is 
impossible to imagine that the Justices who subscribed to Bellotti‘s state-
ments (for example, that Congress might be able to demonstrate a corrup-
tion danger in corporate independent expenditures in candidate elections) 
could have meant what Justice Kennedy understands them to have meant in 
Buckley just two years earlier—that political speech could never be sup-
pressed based on the corporate identity of the speaker.95 
We come, finally, to Justice Kennedy‘s third sentence: ―The corporate 
independent expenditures at issue in this case [paying for the anti-Hillary 
movie and for making it available through video-on-demand technology in 
the final weeks before a federal election] . . . would not interfere with go-
vernmental functions . . . .‖  The sentence is crucial because if it is con-
cluded that no governmental function is being interfered with—in this case 
that corporate electioneering communications do not give rise to an appear-
ance of corruption that interferes with the governmental function of regulat-
ing elections—there is nothing to offset the First Amendment‘s command.  
What exactly is Justice Kennedy‘s basis, then, for this crucial third sen-
tence? 
At the outset we should put aside Justice Kennedy‘s several paeans to 
the value of corporate speech and the harm that may flow from suppressing 
it.  Had soldiers been free to speak against our Vietnam misadventure the 
country might have been spared a great tragedy.  Millions of government 
employees may have particularly useful things to say about what goes on 
inside government agencies.  The issue is not the value of speech; that is 
acknowledged by all.  The issue is whether independent expenditures by 
corporations give rise to an appearance of corruption, for avoiding that ap-
pearance is acknowledged to be a governmental interest compelling enough 





  See supra text accompanying notes 86–87. 
95
  Four years before Buckley was decided, Justice Powell, who joined in the Buckley opinion and 
authored Bellotti, dissented from a decision holding that unions might lawfully make political contribu-
tions and expenditures, notwithstanding the FECA‘s bank/corporation/union prohibition, so long as the 
contributions and expenditures came from funds voluntarily given to the union for such purpose.  Pipe-
fitters Local Union No. 562 v United States, 407 U.S. 385, 444–46 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
Contending that the prohibition on banks‘, corporations‘, and unions‘ contributions and expenditures 
should be accepted as written, Justice Powell said: ―[O]pening of the door to extensive corporate and 
union influence on the elective and legislative processes must be viewed with genuine concern.  This 
seems to me to be a regressive step as contrasted with the numerous legislative and judicial actions in 
recent years designed to assure that elections are indeed free and representative.‖  Id. at 450. 
It demands considerable mental agility to imagine that between arguing in 1972 that it was ―regres-
sive‖ to open the door to extensive corporate and union influence on the elective and legislative 
processes, by not upholding the prohibition of FECA as written, see Pipefitters, 407 U.S. at 450, and in 
1978 that ―Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent cor-
ruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections,‖ see Bellotti, 435 
U.S. at 788 n.26, Justice Powell had concluded in Buckley that a ban on corporate expenditures was fa-
cially unconstitutional. 
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Evidence that corporate independent expenditures give rise to an ap-
pearance of corruption is extensive.  The formal record begins in the 1940s 
when, because corporations and unions had become adept at circumventing 
the contributions ban that dated back to 1907, Congress outlawed indepen-
dent expenditures.96 
By the time Congress enacted the BCRA over fifty years later,97 sub-
stantial information on corporate independent expenditures had been accu-
mulated.  In McConnell, the case that ruled that much of the BCRA was 
constitutional, one of the trial judges had summarized the following from a 
trial record that ran over 100,000 pages: 
 
 Corporations and labor unions routinely notify Members of 
Congress as soon as they air electioneering communications. 
 
 Members of Congress express appreciation for those commu-
nications. 
 
 Campaign organizations are aware of who runs advertisements 
on the candidate‘s behalf, and when and where they are run. 
 
 Members of Congress seek to have corporations and unions 
run such advertisements. 
 
 After elections are over, corporations and unions often seek 
―credit‖ for their support.98 
 
On the basis of this and much other testimony, the judge concluded, 
―The record powerfully demonstrates that electioneering communications 
paid for with the general treasury funds of labor unions and corporations 
endears those entities to elected officials in a way that could be perceived 
by the public as corrupting.‖99 
None of this is surprising.  Nor did it seem so to the American public.  
The McConnell record included a poll in which some 80% of respondents 
said they believed that those who engaged in electioneering communica-
tions received special consideration from the elected officials they had sup-
ported.100
 
Against this background, then, what is the factual basis for Justice 





  See Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60 (1947). 
97
  See supra note 39. 
98
  McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 251 F. Supp. 2d. 176, 623–24 (D.D.C. 2003) (link). 
99
  Id. at 622–23. 
100
  See id. at 623. 
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above, . . . independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, 
do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption‖?101  Astoni-
shingly, there isn‘t any.  The reasons ―explained above‖ are these: 
 
 A reference to Buckley‘s conclusion that the government‘s in-
terest in preventing the appearance of corruption was inade-
quate to justify banning independent expenditures.  Buckley‘s 
conclusion, however, was about a ban that included humans; 
Buckley expressed no conclusion about whether corporate in-
dependent expenditures, considered separately from humans‘ 
independent expenditures, could lead to an appearance of cor-
ruption.102 
 
 An assertion that absence of coordination with the candidate 
―alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid 
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate . . .‖103 
addresses actual corruption, not the appearance of it.  (And ―al-
leviates‖ is not synonymous with ―eliminates.‖) 
 
 An assertion that ―[t]he fact that speakers may have influence 
over or access to elected officials does not mean that these of-




 A reference to the government‘s failure to assert that political 
processes had been corrupted in the twenty-six states that do 
not restrict independent expenditures105 similarly refers to ac-
tual corruption, not the appearance of it.
 
 
 An unsupported assertion that ―the appearance of influence or 
access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our de-
mocracy‖ is followed by two sentences to the effect that 
spending money to persuade voters presupposes that the voters 
have ultimate influence over elected officials, a presupposition 
said to be inconsistent with any suggestion that corporate inde-






  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010). 
102
  See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
103
  Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam)). 
104
  Id. at 910. 
105
  Id. at 908–09. 
106
  See id. at 910. 
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After pointing out that the McConnell record contains no direct exam-
ples of votes being exchanged for expenditures107—it would have been 
―quite remarkable,‖ observes Justice Stevens‘ dissent, if Congress had 
created a record detailing such behavior by its own members108—Justice 
Kennedy concludes as follows: 
 
If elected officials succumb to improper influences from 
independent expenditures; if they surrender their best 
judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then 
surely there is cause for concern.  We must give weight to 
attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the appear-
ance or the reality of these influences.  The remedies 
enacted by law, however, must comply with the First 
Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more 
speech, not less, is the governing rule.109 
 
What emerges from this review of Justice Kennedy‘s ―reasons ex-
plained above‖ is that over six decades of congressional regulation of cor-
porate independent expenditures are swept away by fiat.  There is no—
literally no—factual support for Justice Kennedy‘s crucial third sentence. 
Three further observations may be made about that sentence.  The first 
is to note the irony that Justice Kennedy complains of the government‘s 
failure to offer evidence that corporate independent expenditures may lead 
to an appearance of corruption, while offering up his own contrary conclu-
sion without any evidence at all.110 
The second observation relates to a 2009 case involving a West Virgin-





  Id. (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 560 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
108
  Id. at 965 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
109
  Id. at 911 (majority opinion). 
110
  Moreover, there is at least one reason for the government‘s failure in which Justice Kennedy is 
complicit: supplying such evidence became unnecessary when Citizens United withdrew its claim that 
the BCRA section it challenged was unconstitutional on its face.  When that claim was, in effect, reins-
tated by Justice Kennedy‘s opinion, Justice Kennedy did not offer the government a renewed opportuni-
ty to supply evidence in the now changed circumstances.  As the dissenting opinion put it, ―five Justices 
. . . changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law,‖ id. at 932 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting), but they did not give the government an evidentiary opportunity to address the changed case.  
The dissent added, ―By reinstating a claim that Citizens United abandoned, the Court gives it a perverse 
litigating advantage over its adversary, which was deprived of the opportunity to gather and present in-
formation necessary to its rebuttal.‖  Id. at 933 n.4. 
Having changed the case, Justice Kennedy could still have decided Citizens United on any number 
of narrow grounds and not made the proscription of electioneering communications invalid under any 
and all circumstances and as applied to any type and size of corporation.  Citizens United is, after all, not 
General Motors.  During oral argument, as Justice Stevens points out, Citizens United‘s own lawyer 
conceded that its argument ―definitely would not be the same‖ if the Hillary movie were to be distri-
buted by General Motors.  Id. at 936 (quoting the transcript from oral argument). 
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Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., a West Virginia judge had been elected 
with the aid of enormous independent expenditures by Massey‘s principal 
officer.111  The newly elected judge then cast the deciding vote in a case of 
great significance to Massey Coal.112  Justice Kennedy wrote that the risk of 
bias arising from these facts meant that the judge should have not have 
voted in the case.113 
In his Citizens United opinion Justice Kennedy concluded, correctly, 
that Caperton was distinguishable from Citizens United in a number of 
ways.  For example, it involved a judge and the issue of fair trial, not mem-
bers of Congress and the First Amendment.  Nonetheless, Caperton ac-
knowledges that independent expenditures in candidate elections can lead to 
an appearance of bias.  This makes it all the more surprising that in Citizens 
United Justice Kennedy in effect reaches the contrary conclusion.114 
The third observation is that in deciding that the needs of running pris-
ons, armies, schools, and federal elections justified restrictions on speech, 
the Court had consistently said that it should pay great deference to the 
judgment of those in charge.  In a prisoner case, for example, these matters 
were said to be peculiarly within the province and professional experience 
of corrections officials.115  In Citizens United, deference to the judgment of 
those charged by the Constitution with regulating federal elections is con-
spicuous by its absence. 
III. IN DEFENSE OF JUSTICE KENNEDY? 
Justice Kennedy is an accomplished jurist, and a number of arguments 
may be advanced in an effort to understand how he could have written as he 
did in Citizens United.  Buckley did, after all, rule unconstitutional a section 
of the FECA that banned independent expenditures by corporations (who 
were included in the definition of ―persons‖).116  Post-Buckley Supreme 
Court opinions that leave open the question of whether corporate indepen-
dent expenditures can be treated differently than individual expenditures 
address issues that are technically distinguishable from the issue posed by 





  See 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009) (link). 
112
  See id. at 2257–58. 
113
  See id. at 2266. 
114
  It is also noteworthy that, while distinguishing Caperton because of its different context, see Cit-
izens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910, Justice Kennedy did not similarly distinguish Bellotti because it ad-
dressed referenda rather than candidate elections. 
115
  See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners‘ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977) (link). 
116
  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam).  Buckley‘s reasons for setting aside 
limitations on expenditures while upholding those on contributions, see id. at 14–23, 44–51, are compli-
cated and ultimately unpersuasive.  In practice, they led to a distinction between issue ads and electio-
neering which both ―sides‖ in the campaign finance debate agreed was useless.  See David B. Magleby, 
The Importance of the Record in McConnell v. FEC, 3 ELECTION L. J. 285, 287–88 (2004). 
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In addition, as Harry Kalven observed long ago, the Supreme Court‘s 
First Amendment opinions do not flow ineluctably out of a comprehensive 
theory; neither are they all models of clarity.  A court could scissor snippets 
from them to fashion almost any desired word picture.  It is not surprising, 
then, that in election speech cases the Court has typically been divided, and 
that in some of them Justice Kennedy wrote dissenting opinions arguing 
much as he later did in Citizens United.117 
Moreover, in the real world of politics, it is difficult to draw a clear 
line between discussing issues and electioneering, yet that must be done if 
corporations are to remain free to speak about issues that arise in candidate 
elections.  And even if that line is drawn with reasonable clarity, we face 
the challenge of juxtaposing the speech and press clauses of the First 
Amendment, because no one suggests that the ―press‖—newspapers and 
other media organizations—should be precluded from either candidate or 
issue advocacy even though they are organized in corporate form. 
There is also something to be said in defense of Justice Kennedy‘s re-
fusal to give more weight to the prisoner, soldier, student, and government 
employee precedents.  Elections and election speech lie at the core of our 
democratic system and at the heart of the First Amendment.  Speech about 
election issues and candidates is our central political forum—our national 
town hall meeting, so to speak—where we make fundamental decisions 
about the conduct of our collective lives as citizens.  Here, above all, the 
First Amendment should hold sway.  The same cannot be said about those 
precedents. 
Underlying these and other difficult issues is America‘s strong First 
Amendment tradition that the cure for unpopular or harmful speech is not 
suppression, but more speech (leading the ACLU, for example, to support 
the Citizens United result).118  In the concluding justification for his third 
sentence, Justice Kennedy references ―our law and our tradition that more 
speech, not less, is the [First Amendment‘s] governing rule.‖119 
Justice Kennedy‘s ultimate reliance on First Amendment law and tradi-
tion harkens back to Harry Kalven‘s comment on the challenges of theoriz-
ing about the First Amendment.  As legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin 
points out, some theorizing is nonetheless necessary.  Otherwise the 





  In a separate opinion in a 2003 case, Justice Kennedy referred to several of his dissents in pre-
vious election speech cases, saying he could ―give no weight to those authorities.‖  Fed. Election 
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whenever a judge wants for any reason to protect some form of communica-
tion.‖120 
So what is Justice Kennedy‘s theory in Citizens United?  The most 
prominent is the ―informed electorate‖ theory: ―Freedom of political speech 
is,‖ as Dworkin phrases the theory, ―an essential condition of an effective 
democracy because it ensures that voters have access to as wide and diverse 
a range of information and political opinion as possible.‖121
 
Does the ―informed electorate‖ theory provide a solid philosophical 
base for Justice Kennedy‘s opinion?  Hardly.  Justice Kennedy‘s Citizens 
United opinion offers no reason for supposing (to quote Dworkin again) 
―that allowing rich corporations to swamp elections with money will in fact 
produce a better-informed public.‖122  In fact, Dworkin argues, there are rea-
sons for believing that a worse-informed electorate will be the consequence. 
One reason is that the ―volume‖ of corporate electioneering ―will sug-
gest more public support than there actually is.‖123  (The resources in a busi-
ness corporation‘s treasury are obviously not an indication of popular 
support for the corporation‘s political ideas.)  Another reason is that, al-
though corporate electioneering purports to address the public interest, cor-
porate managers ―are legally required to spend corporate funds only to 
promote their corporation‘s own financial interest.‖124  Dworkin offers this 
illustration of these ―worse-informed‖ consequences: 
 
A public debate about climate change, for instance, would 
not do much to improve the understanding of its audience if 
speaking time were auctioned so that energy companies 
were able to buy vastly more time than academic scien-
tists.125 
 
Indeed, precisely because elections lie at the core of our democratic 
system, Congress‘ desire to protect the integrity of the electoral process 
against the appearance of corruption and the erosion of confidence in this 
core feature of our governance system should be given great weight as one 
of the most compelling of governmental interests.  Perhaps the most fru-
strating aspect of Justice Kennedy‘s Citizens United opinion is its failure 
even to discuss in any meaningful way the tension between a core First 
Amendment value and a most compelling governmental interest.  One 
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why swamping the electorate with corporate-funded broadcast, cable, and 
satellite electioneering communications in the final weeks before federal 
elections will lead to a better-informed electorate.  Instead we are given a 
First Amendment mantra and an airy assertion that corporate electioneering 
will not give rise to an appearance of corruption or cause the electorate to 
lose faith in democracy. 
CONCLUSION 
―Intellectually irresponsible,‖ then, remains a fair characterization of 
Justice Kennedy‘s opinion.  The mishandling of Buckley and Bellotti is 
egregious, the assertion that they compel Citizens United is indefensible.  
The complaint about the absence of factual support, with none supplied for 
his crucial third sentence, is disingenuous.  The corporate ―identity‖ mantra 
ignores the reality that although the capacity of speech to inform the electo-
rate may not depend on whether the speech comes from a corporation or a 
human being, the capacity of speech to give rise to an appearance of corrup-
tion assuredly may. 
Most breathtaking of all is the way in which Justice Kennedy‘s third 
sentence takes leave of common sense.  Recall all those profits of just the 
top 100 of the Fortune 500 companies, and the ratio of more than six lob-
byists for every member of Congress on health care alone.  Without a 
smidgeon of supporting evidence, Justice Kennedy‘s third sentence, in ef-
fect, asserts that members of Congress will be unaffected by now-credible 
threats from those and other lobbyists to spend unlimited sums advertising 
against their reelection.  That the expenditure of such overwhelming sums 
on electioneering will not create precisely the ―political debts‖ that Bellotti 
termed the overriding concerns of the Corrupt Practices Act.  And that the 
making of such credible threats will not create an appearance that justifies 
congressional restrictions on how those billions of corporate dollars can be 
deployed in candidate elections. 
―Political debts‖ may, however, be too tame a description of a harsh 
reality.  As law professor Jamie Raskin puts it, although their outsized cof-
fers would easily enable the Fortune 500 companies to ―participate in every 
single federal and state race in the nation,‖ that will not be necessary.126  If 
the Citizens United opinion has not already made the new reality clear, 
companies spending whatever it takes to defeat a small number of ―target‖ 
candidates will quickly succeed in ―destroy[ing] any future political opposi-
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Polls indicate that the American people have not similarly taken leave 
of common sense.128  What they will or can now do remains to be seen; nu-
merous proposals for a constitutional amendment and for partial legislative 
fixes (such as requiring corporate CEOs to take on-camera responsibility 
for their ads and strengthening disclosure requirements) have surfaced.129  
What is plain, however, is that, while being handed a new paradigm of ―ac-
tivist‖ judging, the American people have been confronted with a fearsome 
problem that cuts to the very core of their governance system.  In a func-
tioning democracy, said Justice Stevens, ―the public must have faith that its 
representatives owe their positions to the people, not to the corporations 
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